INTERVENING IMPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE AS
AFFECTING THE OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS.

"Business contracts must be construed with business sense,
as they naturally would be understood by intelligent men of
affairs."
It would be well to have the foregoing quotation from the
opinion of the Supreme Court, handed down May 7, 1917, in
the case of the "KronprinzessinCecilie," blazoned in a high place
in many court rooms, and it would have a salutary effect if the
Supreme Court frequently used language of this sort to bring
home to the Judiciary of the country the need for breaking
away fr:om the fetters of stare decisis, with a view to accommodating judicial decrees to the needs of an expanding and changing community, needs to which business men are adapting themselves daily.
The courts of England were quick to make reasonable and
common-sense application of old rules to the multiplicity of
questions arising out of the novel situations presented by changing business conditions during the present war.
Many hard and fast rules of the common law affecting
contracts have been modified and their rigor relaxed in favor
of making the rule of liability of contracting parties more nearly
approach equitable considerations and the obligations imposed
more nearly commensurate with the situation and surroundings
and capability of performance of contracting parties.
The rights of parties to contracts, affected by governmental
interference, as by requisition or commandeering, have been equitably adjusted, so that the benefits of compensation by the Government or the losses incident to the activity of the Government
may be equitably divided between the parties to the. contract.'
During the present war in which this country is now
engaged, because of the many changes in contracts, which the
activities of the Government and the exigencies of the abnormal
'See decision of Judge Rowlatt in the case of Chinese Engineering &
Mining Co., Ltd., v. Sale & Co., II K. B. (917) 599. See also Modem Trans.
Co. v. Dunerie S. S. Co., i K. B. Div. (917)
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situations will bring about, no rule of law will perhaps be more
applied and call more frequently for judicial interpretation than
2
the'so-called rule in Paradine v. Jane.
The exact question presented for decision in Paradine v.
Jane, was whether a lessee who had covenanted to pay rent was
required to do so, although ousted from possession by a superior
enemy force. The defendant pleaded
"that a certain German prince, by name Prince Rupert, an alien
born, enemy to the King and his kingdom, had invaded the realm
with a hostile army of men; and with the same force did enter upon
the defendant's possession, had him expelled, and held out of possession . . . whereby he could not take the profits."
This was held to be no excuse for the non-payment of the rent.
And the report continues:
"And this difference was taken, that where the law creates a duty
or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it without any default in him, and hath no remedy over, there the law will excuse
him. As in the case of Waste, if a house be destroyed by tempest,
or by enemies, the lessee is excused. . . . But when the party by
his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound
to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his
contract. And therefore, if the lessee covenant to repair a house,
though it may be burnt by lightning or thrown down by enemies,
yet he ought to repair it."
It is to be noted that the court in this case required the party to
perform that portion of his contract which called for the payment of money because "he might"-that is to say, nothing done
by the German prince had prevented his paying money, and,
therefore, the defence raised was not a defence which indicated
performance prevented by intervening circumstances.
However, following this decision, courts were not wanting
which held that if a contract was made to perform an act at a
future time, and no exception stated, persons so contracting
would be liable for non-performance even though an intervening
vent-even an act of God-prevented performance, and rested
their decision on their conception of the rule in Paradinev. Jane.
3
As early as 1833, a writer in the American Jurist pointed
2 (z647) Aleyn 26.
a io American Jurist 250.
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out the absurdity of this doctrine, and urged a reconsideration of
the cases by which the doctrine had been fostered, on the ground
that the courts in enforcing contracts where performance was
rendered impossible, were really adding a term to the contract
made by the parties-the courts were making the contract read
that performance would take place "at all events."
But until the advent of the present war, the rule in England
could not be said to have been clearly settled, and much confusion existed in the various decisions of our state and federal
courts.
In England, courts, in laying down the rule based upon
a strict interpretation of the doctrine in Paradine v. Jane,
reached many absurd results. For instance, in Gillespie & Co. v.
Howden Co.,4 there was a contract for building of a ship of
specified dimensions and carrying power, according to a model.
When the ship was built it was found to be deficient in the
required carrying capacity and in an action for damages by the
purchaser, although it was shown to be impossible to build a
seaworthy ship of the required dimensions and carrying capacity,
according to the model, the court held that this was no excuse.
And in Hills v. Sughrue,5 where the owner of a ship agreed
to load a cargo of guano at Ichaboe, and failed to load, because
no guano could be had at Ichaboe, the owner was* held liable
because of his covenant to load such a cargo.
In Spence v. Chadwick,6 a ship owner was held liable on a
charter for failure to carry goods which he was unable to carry,
because the goods had been seized at Cadiz and condemned as
contraband.
So in Jacobs, Marcus & Co. v. The Credit Lyonais, a defendant was held liable for failure to deliver esparto although
failure to deliver was because of the prohibition on the export
of esparto from Algeria by the authorities.
'(1885) x2 Sess.
15 M. & W. 25
x6 L I. P 313
12 L I. Q. B.

Cas. 8oo.
(1846).
0847).
D. 589 (1884).
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In America the rule was applied with the same absurd
results in a number of cases. 8
A good illustration is the case of West v. The Uncle Sam,9
where a carrier was held responsible for non-performance of a
contract of carriage although he set up impossibility due to the
possession of part of his route by a foreign army.
The American rule, formerly applied in all its rigor notwithstanding that the court calls attention to the harshness
attendant upon its application, is best stated in the language of
the court in Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific
R. R. Co. 10 as follows:
"The general rule is that, where an obligation or a duty is imposed upon a person by law, he will be absolved from liability for
non-performance of the obligation, if such non-performance was
occasioned by an act of God. This rule is illustrated in the case of
common carriers. The rule, however, is just as clear that, when a
man undertakes by an express contract to do a given act, he is not
absolved from liability for non-performance, even though he is prevented from doing the same by an act of God. In that class of cases,
if a person desires to absolve himself from liability for non-performance under any circumstances, he should so stipulate in his contract."

Beginning with the case of Taylor & Caldwell,"' in England, and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Hoyt,12 in
America, there was manifest a tendency to construe with more
liberality, contracts for performance in futuro and not to read
into covenants to perform a certain thing, the words "at all
events."
A survey of the various cases where the defense of impossibility, intervening subsequent to the making of the contract,
was considered, indicates that both in England and America the
following rules obtain:
I. It is a good defense to an absolute agreement to perform an act, that performance has been rendered illegal
'See Jones v. U. S., 96 U. S.
Rust, ig Federal 239 (i883).

* (1859) Fed. Cas. 17427.
"31 Fed. 440 (I887).

"3 B. & S. 826 (1863).
1249 U. S. i (zip).

24

(1887) ; Texas & St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
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by reason of a change in the law; although as we shall
see, this rule is not as yet clearly defined owing to the
confusion on the subject caused by the decision in the
case of the Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P.
McDonald Co.1 3 which holds that a change in foreign
law which makes performance illegal or even impossible, is not a defense.
2. It is a good defense that the specific thing, the existence
of which is essential to performance of the contract, is
destroyed.
3- It is a good defense in the case of a contract for personal services, that the party to perform, is incapacitated by sickness.
A fourth excuse for non-performance and one of broader
and equally logical application, results from the language of the
Supreme Court in the "Kronprinzessin" case when speaking of
the contract in that case-the bill of lading-the court said:
"It embodied simply an ordinary bailment of a common carrier
subject to the implied exceptions which it would be extravagant to
say would be excluded because they'were not written in."
This doctrine is not altogether new, but it has never been
expressed in this form by the courts before. It was referred to
by the New York courts in the case of Kinser Construction Co.
v. State as a situation "where conditions essential to performance do not exist."
Mr. Frederick C. Woodward, writing in the Columbia Law
Review, 1 5 suggested this fourth exception as follows:
"If the contingency which makes the contract impossible of
performance is such that the parties to the contract, had they actually contemplated it, would probably have regarded it as so obviously terminating the obligation as not to require expression, failure
of performance should be excused."
Such a statement of the rule is, however, entirely too
narrow, and, indeed, was not, at the time it was suggested, in
14 Fed. 985 ( 19 ).

U415 N. Y. S. 46 (r9io).
"V€OL 1,P.533.
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accordance with the language of the Supreme Court in the case
of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Hoyt,16 as follows:
"There can be no question that a party may by an absolute
contract bind himself or itself to perform things which subsequently become impossible or pay damages for the non-performance, and such construction is to be put upon an unqualified undertaking, where the event which causes the impossibility might
have been anticipated and guarded against in the contract or where
the impossibility arises from the act or default of the promisor.
But where the event is of such a characterthat it cannot be reasonably supposed io have been in the contemplation of the contracting
parties when the contract was made, they will not be held bound by
general words, which though large enough to include were not
used with reference to the possibility of the particular contingency
which afterwards happens."
The extent of the present-day doctrine in England that an
intervening contingency which makes for impossibility of performance of the contract, is a defence, is clearly set forth in the
case of Horlock v. Beale 17 where all of the authorities were
reviewed by Earl Loreburn and the limitations on the doctrine
were clearly laid down by the same judge in the subsequent case
of Tamplin v. Anglo-Mexican Co."8
In the case of Horlock v. Beale, the wife of a seaman who
had agreed to serve on a voyage not exceeding two years' duration, sued on an allotment note given by the shipowner under
which he agreed to pay the wife one-half of the monthly wages
of her husband during the period of the voyage. The ship on
which the husband was serving as a seaman was in the port of
Hamburg at the outbreak of the war between England and
Germany and the ship and seamen were detained in that port, the
seamen being subsequently interned in Germany near Berlin.
The wife sued on the contract for the wages and the defendant set up impossibility of performance of the contract because
of the intervention of the German government.
The case itself was first tried before a judge of the Commercial Court who found that the defense of impossibility of
performance could not absolve the shipowner. An appeal from
149 U. S. 1 (1892).

1t

L. R. i App. Cas. (1916) 486.
"L. R. 2 App. Cas. (1916) 397.
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this judgment was taken to the Court of Appeals and that court
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
On appeal to the House of Lords that body considered the
question as one involving solely the question of impossibility of
performance intervening after the making of a contract.
Lord Loreburn speaking for the majority stated:
"In my view the first question to be decided is whether or not
and at what date the performance of this contract of service became impossible, which means impracticable in a commercial
sense,"
and after finding that the date of internment was the date which
made the contract impossible of performance stated the ruling to
be as follows:
"In "my opinion, neither party was any longer bound by that
contract from that date. If they were bound it must mean that
wages were to be paid, without any service in return, for the entire
duration of this war, or, in the present case, till the expiry of two
years from the commencement of the service. The Napoleonic
war after the rupture of the Peace of Amiens lasted for eleven
years. I think it was an implied term of this service, subject to
any special law affecting seamen, that it should be practicable for
the ship to sail on.this voyage, in that sense which disregards minor
interruptions and takes notice only of what substantially ends th6
possibility of the service contemplated being fulfilled. Both employer and employed made their bargain on the footing that, whatever temporary interruption might supervene, the ship and crew
would be available to carry out the adventure."
It was in this language that the court enunciated the doctrine that a subsequent event which completely frustrates the basic purpose of the contract, or destroys the object for which
it is made, will discharge the obligations of the contracting parties, because the court will imply into a contract an exception to
govern the subsequent happening. To hold otherwise would be
really to add to the contract between the parties, the term that
performance will be made "at all events."
Lord Shaw of .Dunfermline, relied in his concurring judgment very much upon the authority of Mr. Justice Blackburn,
who had laid down the ruling in Taylor v. Caldwell, 9 that in
213

B. & S. 826 (1863).
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"a positive contract to do .athing, not in itself unlawful, the contractor must perform or pay damages for not performing, although
in consequence of unforeseen accidents, the performance of his

contract had become impossible,'!
but held the rule applicable only to a contract positive and
absolute and not subject to any condition express or implied,
holding that where from the nature of the contract it would

appear that the parties from the beginning must have known
that it could not be performed unless at the time for performance
some specific thing continued to exist, then they must at the

making of the contract have contemplated the continued existence as its foundation and the contract would be construed,
although a positive contract, as subject to an implied condition
that the parties will be excused in case before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perishing of the thing without
the fault of either party.
Lord Blackburn's opinion, in Taylor v. Caldwell, supra, was
founded upon his survey of the Civil Law. He cited Digest 45,
I, 33 and Digest 46, I, 23, to the effect that the obligation of a
contract is founded upon the certo corpore and cites the illustration given in the Digest of a promise with regard to a slave, viz.,
that if under a contract to transfer a slave, before performance
was due, the slave died or was manumitted, the contracting party
was freed of his obligation, unless, of course, he was responsible
for either the death or manumission, and, unless, of course, he
had by some definite stipulation, taken on himself the risk of the
happening of the event.
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline points out that the research of
Mr. Justice Blackburn in the Civil Law, had not been exhaustive
and that the doctrine set forth in Taylor v. Caldwell was more
extensive even in the Civil Law, citing Digest 45, I, 91 and Book
18, de contrahendaemptione.
Lord Shaw observes that not only had the principle been
laid down in the Civil Law, but its modem development as enunciated in Horlock v. Beale, supra, had been foreshadowed in
Roman times, quoting from Mr. Hunter on Roman Law, page
638, the following dictum:
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"Sempronius promises. to give a small plot of ground to Maevius. After doing so, he buries a dead body in the place, and thus
makes the land extra-commercium. Sempronius must pay its
value. If the land had belonged to another, who had buried a body
in it, he would have been released."
He points out that this illustration shows that if the basis
of the transaction-the root of the contract-the thing which
was in contemplation of the parties, has ceased to exist, or has
suffered such an alteration as to prevent performance, the obligation itself falls, and states the rule as follows:
"The underlying ratio is the failure of something which was
at the basis of the contract in the mind and intention of the contracting parties.
"The ratio has, I am humbly of opinion, been properly developed in recent years. I do not go through all the decisions,.but 1
think it right to mention that of Krell [Krell v. Henry, 2 K. B. 740
(i9o3) ], in which I desire to attach my respectful and pointed concurrence in the opinion delivered by Vaughan Williams, L. J., in
these passages: 'Whatever may have been the limits of the Roian
law, the case of Nickoll v. Ashton makes it plain that the English
law applies the principle not only to cases where the performance
of the contract becomes impossible by the cessation of existence of
the thing which is the subject-matter of .the contract, but also to
cases where the event which renders the contract incapable of performance is the cessation or non-existence of an express condition
or state of things going to the root of the contract.'
"This view is fully discussed by the learned judge. I think it
to be in entire accord with that doctrine of frustration of voyage
which has become fully accepted since the case of Jackson v.
Union Marine Ins. Co. with the doctrine underlying Taylor v. Caldwell, and with sound legal principle."
It will be of advantage perhaps for the sake of dearness to
set out the rule in the language of Lord Wrenbury, who filed a
concurring opinion in Horlock v. Beale:
"Where a contract has been entered into, and by a supervening
cause beyond the control of either party its performance has become
impossible, I take the law to be as follows: If a party has expressly
contracted to do a lawful act, come what will-if, in other words,
he has taken upon himself the risk of such a supervening cause-he
is liable if it occurs, because by the very hypothesis he has contracted to be liable. But if he had not expressly so contracted, and
from the nature of the contract it appears that the parties from the
first must have known that its fulfilment'would become impossible
if such a supervening cause occurred, then upon such a cause occurring both parties are excused from performance. In that case a
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condition is implied that if performance becomes impossible the contract shall not remain binding. The leading case on the subject is
Taylor v. Caldwell. Krell v. Henry is an illustration of the application of the principle."
In England therefore it appears that the doctrine that an
intervening contingency which renders performance impossible
will be an excuse, even though a positive contract has been made
to do a thing, is not firmly fixed.
In America we think that the rule is broadened and any
doubt set at rest by the language of the Supreme Court in the
case of the "Kronprinzessin Cecilie."
In that case the Supreme Court had to decide between the
conflicting claims presented on the one side by the claim of the
libellants of the "Kronprinzessin Cecilie" that having shipped
their gold under a bill of lading which was an absolute agreement
to transport, subject only to the exception of arrest and restraint
of princes, rulers and peoples, and containing no other exception,
and, therefore (exceptions noted excluded), creating an obligation on the part of the steamship to transport the gold at all
events, and the claim, on the other hand, of the respondents, that
regardless of any exception contained in the bill of lading, the
court should imply in the contract of the parties an exception
covering the situation arising out of the war, because to hold that
the parties would have contracted as they did, with such a situation in contemplation would be extravagant.
It is interesting to observe that although the case of Paradine
v. Jane was adverted to in the argument before the court, the
decisions of the House of Lords in the case of Horlock v.
Beal, and in the case of Tamplin Steamship Co. v. Anglo-Mexican PetroleumProductsCo. 2 0 seem not to have been called to the
attention of the court, but whether or not those cases were before
the court the result reached by our Supreme Court was identical
with the results reached by the Hbuse of Lords in both cases
mentioned, and these results should settle for all time the question of intervening impossibility of performance as affecting
obligations of a party to a contract.
"'2L. R. App. Cas. (1916)
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It remains to consider the effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the Kronprin~essin Cecilie" case upon the
decision of the District Court of New York in the case of the
Tweedie Trading Co. v. James P. McDonald Co. 21 In the latter
case the action was in admiralty. The libellant and defendant
had entered into a contract in the United States by which the
libellant agreed to make four trips with its steamship from Barbadoes to Colon to transport laborers for the defendant. The
defendant contracted to pay a stated sum for each trip. The
contract when made was legal and valid in the United States
and also at Barbadoes. After two trips had been made a regulation of the colonial government of the Barbadoes was put
into effect which forbade the future embarkation of laborers.
The defendant, therefore, was not able to furnish any more
laborers for transportation. Suit was brought by the shipowner
for the charter hire for the last trip and a cross action was
brought by the contractor for repayment of the third installment
of charter hire paid by him. The court held the charterer or
contractor liable to pay the charter hire for the full four trips
and that he was not excused therefrom by reason of the prohibition of the exportation of laborers from the Barbadoes. The
court said :22
"The contractwas valid in its inception, both at the place of making and the place of performance, and was capable of being performed until an event intervened which was not in the contemplation
of the parties when the contract was made.

.

.

.

The question

really is, do the legal acts of the agents of a foreign government,
which prevent the full performance of a contract of this character,
control the rights of the parties? Contracting parties are subject
to the contingencies of changes in their own law and liable to have
the execution of their contracts prevented thereby; but it is on thd
ground of illegality, not of impossibility. Prevention by the law of
a foreign country is not usually deemed an excuse, when the act
which was contemplated by the contract was valid in view of the
law of the place where it was made.

.

.

While the decision in the case can be supported upon the
reasoning running through all of the cases which hold that where
Fed. 985 (1902).
22P. 988.
21114
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there is a contract to pay money and the intervening frustrating
cause does not prevent the payment of the money, this payment
will be required, yet the basis of the decision was not upon this
ground, but upon the absurd ground that the foreign law was
a "fact" and, apparently, therefore, necessarily must have been in
contemplation of the parties, but, in the language of the Supreme
Court, it would seem to be "extravagant to say" that because a
contract was made in this country, but to be performed in
another, that a change of law in the other country making performance impossible, was not such an intervening frustrating
circumstance as to warrant the deduction that if the possibility
of the change had been drawn to the attention of the contracting
parties, that they would not have said "of course, if that occurs,
no obligation can be enforced on this contract on either side."
The result of the decisions in both America and England
is that unless a contrary intention clearly appears from the contract of the parties, the court will imply an exception to the
contract to govern an intervening subsequent event, which makes
performance of the contract impossible in fact, and excuse the
contracting parties from liability for non-performance, and this
is in accord with the dictates of sound business and sound
sense.
William J.Conlen.
Philadelphia.

